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ABSTRACT
　This paper describes a case study of denim jeans production in the Sambi district of western 
Japan and discusses the relevance of ‘flexible specialization’ in order to characterize the production 
capabilities of industrial agglomeration displayed under conditions of uncertainty. In spite of the 
general belief that flexible specialist networks provide adaptive production capabilities, a vertical 
integration strategy accompanied by heavy capital intensification can continuously develop high 
quality products as well as spread risk. The case study of a denim fabric factory, Kaihara, shows 
how vertical integration circumvented voluntary but costly coordination and collaboration amongst 
network members and functioned to construct an infrastructure for communal learning by linking 
different types of customers. It is also reported that these seem to be merely unintended effects of 
actions taken for short-sighted motives. 
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INTRODUCTION
　This paper reports on a case study of denim jeans production in a specific industrial district in Japan which 
has been known as a traditional production venue of cotton fabrics and related final products. It also discusses 
the relevance of ‘flexible specialization’ as an analytical concept to understand the production capabilities which 
industrial agglomerations are deemed to display under a post mass production paradigm. The conclusion will 
be that, in spite of the general belief that flexible specialist networks provide adaptive production capabilities, 
especially when faced with unforeseeable consumer needs and volatile demand, sometimes a vertical integration 
strategy accompanied by heavy capital intensification can create various opportunities to continuously develop 
high quality products by spreading risk. In this respect, the denim fabric factory, Kaihara Corporation, is a good 
example. It has been known for its vertical integration strategy involving cotton spinning, dyeing, weaving and 
finishing processes, and also for continuously developing high quality product prototypes for segmented markets 
that serve various types of consumers. 
　The next section below explains the purpose of this paper. The third section describes the competitive 
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environment of Japan’s denim jeans industry in general, and gives an overall picture of the Sambi industrial 
district. The fourth section sketches how Kaihara adapted to new business environments. In the last section, a 
theoretical elaboration is attempted. 
RESEARCH QUESTION
　Since Piore and Sable claimed that in a post-Fordist paradigm more flexible manufacturing philosophies 
supplied not so much standardized commodities to mass markets as a wide variety of quality products to rather 
diversified consumers, industrial agglomerations composed of small sized firms with specific manufacturing 
capabilities have attracted the attention of more and more researchers [7]. 
　Although the authors are known for their terminology ‘flexible specialization’ in order to characterize the 
emergent organizing principle of manufacturing efforts in emerging countries which began to threaten American 
economic hegemony worldwide in the post-war period, they were not the inventor of the term. There was a 
common theoretical and empirical ground where people’s beliefs had been weakened at a metaphysical level 
concerning the systematic predictability and controllability of phenomenal worlds on the basis of positivistic 
intellectual traditions in both natural and social sciences [8]. So called ‘adaptive complex systems’ show 
indeterministic or non-linear reactions to outside stimuli in contrast to the way positivist views anticipate 
them; these can be observed in a wide range of phenomenal worlds from neuro-systems and cellular tissues to 
animal and human societies. Flexible specialization is one of the features which such adaptive complex systems 
demonstrate. As is observed in the human brain, autonomous neurons (agents) interact with each other without 
any central controlling mechanism and the individual neuron network (sub-system) localizes or lateralizes 
its functions (functional specialization) within the whole brain (self-organized system). In an analogy of this 
conception, Piore and Sable attempt to caricature the mass production and consumption paradigm which had 
a strong inclination toward central control of economic activities through relatively bureaucratic governance 
mechanisms. On the other hand, German mechanical engineering, Italian textiles and Japanese automobile 
industries were regarded as providing alternative benchmarks to the traditional American counterparts. 
　Piore and Sable suggested that capital investment in large factories characterized by a thorough division of 
labor, unskilled workers and highly integrated automation systems would not disappear completely, but would 
be gradually replaced by flexible networks of highly skilled professionals who own special purpose production 
facilities and work on a contract basis. Collaboration based on the expectation of long term contracts was 
expected to strengthen mutual trust and would, therefore, lubricate information flows and facilitate knowledge 
creation processes amongst these professionals. 
　Ten years later, Saxenian empirically supported this rosy image of industrial agglomeration by reporting on 
IT clusters in San Francisco, which had allegedly become a strong booster for the bearish US economy at that 
time [9]. ‘Virtual organization’ and ‘open innovation’ became buzzwords for a management system which was 
assumed to excel when compared to the bureaucratic ‘big elephants’ of large corporate organizations [3]. It 
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was in 1996, in its white paper on small businesses, that the Japanese government emphasized the importance 
of restructuring national production systems [4]. Through the 1980s, keiretsu production networks of large 
assembly firms and hierarchically organized affiliate companies joined by long term contracts were known for 
their rigid quality and cost control compared with their American counterparts. Competition amongst affiliate 
companies on the same hierarchical level was loosely controlled by the parent companies’ ‘visible hands’ but 
at the same time was modestly counterbalanced by the links between affiliates to a number of keiretsu. This 
resulted in creative bottom-up problem-solving strategies and scale economies which the affiliates could not 
have enjoyed if they had relied too much on a single keiretsu. However, faced with the globalization of the 
economy and the rise of other Asian countries, the Japanese keiretsu systems were adaptive only as long as the 
value added per employee remained at a high standard; but in sectors which produced relatively standardized 
commodities, the ‘robust but stubborn hierarchical order’ gradually lost its competitive meaning. The Japanese 
government recommended further R&D efforts to satisfy more diversified consumer needs, and also demanded 
that the keiretsu systems ‘must be reformed into more flexible horizontal networks’ that were supposedly 
characteristic of Silicon Valley in the US or the European benchmarks provided by Piore and Sable. 
　Interestingly, however, many management scholars who emphasize field research point out that a certain 
hierarchical aspect of specialist networks still remained. Ever since Seki, one of the most influential scholars 
in this research area in Japan, shed light on prototype producing companies as central players linking local 
specialist networks with potential customers outside local districts, a great deal of research effort was directed 
toward structural analyses of how successful industrial agglomerations functioned throughout Japan [10]. Such 
retrospective explanations pointed out that network-central actors contributed to linking local districts with the 
outside world and to balancing the creative aspects of flexible networks and scale economies. It seemed that 
networks would not benefit from seemingly incompatible factors as long as they relied on numerous random 
small lot contracts between mediocre SMEs. 
　This paper will now try to sketch such hierarchical aspects from a different perspective. It is assumed that 
central players must face ambivalent strategic options, one of which is, of course, to be central and the other 
is to become an expert member of the network. Instead of acquiring many functions within a large corporation 
which tend to accrue substantial fixed costs, a preferred strategy for many firms involved in global competition 
is to narrow their activity to the functions which they are best at. But why do they have to be central even 
though it looks superficially disadvantageous? Through a construction of the business history of a denim textile 
manufacturer in the Sambi district in Japan this paper will try to uncover what sort of decisions central players 
have taken in order to occupy their present position. 
　Before going into the details of the case, it seems useful to borrow a framework from existing research and 
to summarize one hypothetical understanding. About 90 years ago, Knight ascribed profits from economic 
activities in modern market economies to the ‘uncertainties’ which entrepreneurs daily faced in their business 
environment [6]. This was in contrast to the ‘risks’ which, theoretically, commodity and financial futures 
markets could completely absorb and could, therefore, never be the source of profits. 
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Traditional production networks can be understood from the perspective of ‘risk. ’In Japan, specialists were 
organized within keiretsu networks where parent companies initiated product definitions in order to limit product 
line varieties and minimize accidental defects, inventory and sales losses and other general expenses. Whether 
the manufacturers could gain profits or not was simply a matter of ‘risk’ which meant that the volatilities of 
market demands and keiretsu networks were best suited to function like fraternal insurance communities. 
　As the global environment changed and parent companies looked for new production venues worldwide, 
the keiretsu dissolved and the specialists faced ‘uncertainties’ for the first time. Many of the specialist affiliate 
companies gave up continuing their family businesses and the remainder who had the will to survive were urged 
to form flexible networks among themselves. This was mainly to replace decreasing orders from the original 
parent companies with those from newer and more remote customers. This was not a simple task; affiliate 
companies had to sell their professional skills to potential customers and coordinate amongst themselves to put 
various ideas into practice. This kind of collaboration and partition of responsibilities and potential profits took 
substantial time and energy. The reality of the flexible specialization of a district was such that the rationale 
for doing everything alone, namely a vertical integration strategy in order to avoid coordination costs, became 
relevant. In this context, Kaihara became known for its vertical integration strategy involving cotton spinning, 
dyeing, weaving and finishing processes. As a result it continuously developed high quality product prototypes 
for various types of customers. 
CASE: KAIHARA
　Since 1965, when the very first denim jeans in Japan were produced in the Sambi district of Okayama and 
Hiroshima, recurring booms brought wealth into the limited reclaimed lands along the Inland Sea. However, 
the collapsed bubble economy in 1992 and the devaluation of the Chinese yuan in 1994 had a big impact on 
local economies throughout Japan. Moreover, in 2000, the First Retailing Company introduced Chinese made 
low price men’s denim jeans which attracted a substantial number of consumers away from traditional local 
manufacturers. Since then, relatively large national brand manufacturers at the top of their respective keiretsu 
networks have shifted their sales to women’s clothing where consumers change their styles seasonally. The 
competitive environment is very tough; women’s fashion markets are very uncertain in terms of both consumer 
needs forecasts and demand volatilities. National brands have also shifted their production venues to foreign 
countries. It is said that roughly 70% of the whole manufacturing process has been transferred to China. In 
contrast, relatively small sized firms that have lost orders from parent customers have been trying to form 
more horizontal networks. Some of them started trying to develop new styles for sales promotions outside of 
their district and the more active firms are trying to establish their own quality brands. Such players are often 
OEM manufacturers or textile trading companies which receive orders from merchandisers of national brands, 
downstream apparel conglomerates or specialty chain stores. 
　There is also less pessimistic data as the Sambi district has experienced a successful restructuring of industrial 
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organization relative to other districts throughout Japan. Since large national brands shifted their production 
venues away from this district many affiliate companies have closed down but the added value per business 
establishment or per employee has improved. One of the reasons for this is the concentration of firms that carry 
out chemical and physical processing of raw denim jeans, which is called ‘damage processing.’ Originally, 
consumers bought raw denim jeans and changed them to their taste by damaging them on purpose, but new 
processing techniques to add value to such raw jeans were said to be first invented in this district in the 1980s. 
Piecework fees for damage processing tend to be higher than more traditional processes such as sewing. Firms 
cannot claim more fees for traditional processes than in the past due to the fact that prices are generally rigid 
upward and because the 1980s, which was the most prosperous age in Japanese economic history, provided 
the benchmark for piecework fees. Furthermore, since these processing techniques are now so important in the 
design of final products, the concentration of expert companies attracts and retains development and planning 
teams from the final product manufacturers in this district. Overall, although the total number of businesses 
in the apparel industry in Japan has been decreasing year by year, the number of establishments and annual 
turnover in Kojima in the Sambi district has shown a slight increase. 
　Turning our eyes to more upstream denim textile production, the market is composed of three players, two of 
which, Kurabo Industries and Nisshin Denim, have their origins in the cotton spinning industry and the other, 
Kaihara, stemmed from the traditional kasuri textile industry. Kurabo originated before World War II in the city 
of Kurashiki, of which one area is the above mentioned Kojima. Later it shifted its headquarters to Osaka, but the 
cotton spinning factory for denim fabrics existed in Okayama which is to the north east of Kurashiki until recent 
years. Nisshin Denim is an affiliate company of Nisshinbo which is also one of the biggest spinning companies in 
Japan. It began in Tokushima Prefecture in Shikoku which is on the opposite side of the Inland Sea to Kurashiki. 
Kaihara’s location is in Fukuyama in Hiroshima Prefecture, sharing the west border of Okayama Prefecture. 
　Traditional kasuri textiles are unique in terms of their manufacturing process. Usually, textiles are woven 
from raw fabric and then designs are dyed on and printed. In contrast, when producing kasuri, the process is the 
other way around. First, hundreds of threads are bound very tightly with other threads at calculated intervals. 
Next, these are soaked in indigo dye and squeezed. After repeating this process a few times, the washed and 
dried threads are untied creating patterns on the original threads since the areas tightly tied are not dyed and 
remain white. These threads are then set on the weaving machines so that the indigo-white patterns of threads 
create two dimensional mosaic patterns on the fabric. Denim fabric production methods are similar to kasuri 
because dyeing comes before weaving. 
　There is an acute distinction amongst the top three denim jeans companies. Kaihara is known for its vertical 
integration strategy involving cotton spinning, dyeing, weaving and finishing processes. The other two 
companies have developed in the opposite direction, which means that they have leaner production facilities and 
take advantage of affiliate company networks. 
　Generally speaking, material industries tend to pursue vertical integration strategies and build integrated 
production systems in order to make the most of scale economies. This is especially true in the case of the 
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textile industry. Further, in addition to marketers from apparel manufacturers and distribution businesses, most 
upstream spinning companies demonstrate leadership throughout the product planning and manufacturing 
process because the quality of spinning has a major impact on how final apparel products look and feel. 
Denim jeans are typical in this regard since the final look and texture of the jeans after chemical and physical 
processing depends on the characteristics of the threads such as the blend of cotton fibers, the thickness and 
intensity of the twist of threads and the degree of dye penetration. Therefore, strategic actions possibly taken 
by spinning companies can be positioned in a relatively formalized manner as follows. Namely, two extreme 
cases are possible; one is for the spinning companies to outsource everything but spinning to expert affiliate 
companies, and the other is to internalize all the processes of the whole value chain continuum as far as final 
product manufacturing. Realities should exist probably between these two extreme cases.
　Capital intensification and aggressive vertical integration do not necessarily signify that the companies 
concerned play the same roles as played by central actors in the network structures. The discerning point here is 
the variety in customer bases which the competing spinning companies serve. By definition, the central network 
players must serve various types of customers but sometimes less welcome customers enter the networks. Some 
customers are cost sensitive and are not willing to pay premium prices for higher quality, punctual delivery 
and custom built products. Others have innovative ideas to realize quality final products but their lot-sizes are 
too small. It is an important point to make as to whether the players accept such less willing customers in their 
networks or let potential deals with them go. 
　The textile industry used to be the driving force behind Japanese economic growth after World War II but it 
soon became the target of trade conflict with the US. It is still believed that in exchange for the Okinawa islands 
in 1972, the Japanese government forcefully consolidated the domestic industry. The phrase, ‘Japan bought 
ropes by threads’ (the Chinese character 縄 (nawa) of Okinawa means a rope) meant that spinning companies 
with enormous fixed capital, including large production facilities, bureaucratic managerial organizations and 
complex trade and distribution networks which had been developed since the Meiji era, started on the long 
process of scaling down and diversifying their founding business in order to improve their capital utilization. The 
original spinning departments concentrated their efforts on diversified quality products such as thinner and/or 
blended spinning. They collaborated with apparel manufacturers for new product planning but the actual textile 
production processes were outsourced to reduce production costs. Nisshin Denim buys cotton yarn from its 
parent company and sells denim textiles to apparel manufacturers. Kurabo actively utilizes expert networks and 
has established its own weaving and final production processes outside Japan. In order to be competitive against 
cheaper imports, these outsourcing policies are unavoidable but the reality is that Kurabo’s high quality denim is 
said to be the most expensive in the world and only established national brand manufacturers can afford it. 
　Kaihara was established in 1893 and has been a specialized denim producer since the 1970s. Traditional 
Japanese textiles are narrow in width and sell by tanmono, which is a long rolled-up cloth approximately 40 cm 
wide. Wide weaving machines enabled this local company, whose markets were seriously shrinking due to the 
modernization of Japanese society, to use traditional kasuri for western clothes. It also exported colorful kasuri 
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to Middle East countries for women’s clothes. Under the Bretton Woods system, defeated nations in World War 
II received economic support including fixed currency exchange rates advantageous for exports, which meant 
that a small local textile manufacturer could earn more than they had lost due to the changing life styles of 
the Japanese people. However, there were also a number of negative influences from abroad. In 1967, Britain 
devalued its currency by 14. 3% against the US dollar and in 1971 President Nixon announced the end of the 
American gold standard system with the result that the US dollar was reduced by 16. 8% against the Japanese 
yen. Kaihara’s profits instantly decreased since exports to the Middle East were settled in British pounds, and 
as they also suffered from large inventory losses they turned their eyes to the domestic market again. In the 
1960s, US army surplus denim jeans were sold in Tokyo and became a staple of young people’s fashion. The 
first Japanese denim jeans in Kojima were made of grade B fabrics imported from US weaving mills. Kaihara 
decided to enter these markets. 
　Kaihara had much more experience of dyeing and weaving compared with other denim fabric producers. 
Furthermore, they started to pursue the integrated automation of their production facilities. The rope dyeing 
machines purchased in 1970, the air weaving machines in 1978, the final processing machines in 1980, and 
the air spinning machines in 1991 created the newest fully automated denim textile production lines in Japan 
at that time. The company had extremely high productivity and quality control even after the depreciation of 
the Chinese yuan in 1994 and the impact of the skyrocketing Japanese yen in 1995, which was about 80 yen 
per US dollar. Both these currency events delayed Japan’s recovery from recession during the 1990s and had a 
destructive impact on local economies. 
　A dramatic increase in Kaihara’s sales came around 2000. This was when First Retailing introduced low price 
denim jeans with materials supplied by Kaihara. Kaihara’s turnover in 2007 was 35 billion yen and its domestic 
market share was estimated at 50%. Concerning its segment sales ratios, one third was for First Retailing, one 
third was for domestic sales, and the final third was for exports. Since First Retailing produced denim jeans 
in Chinese factories, Kaihara was very dependent on foreign exports. It is interesting to note that, according 
to one national newspaper (Asahi Shinbun, October 3, 2008), Kaihara quality products are not cheap but are 
comparable with other denim jeans producers. Amongst its quality advantages, especially its quality stability 
derived from its expertise in dyeing and its integrated production lines, are preferable differentiating features for 
its customers who have established production facilities in China. These customers tend to have two problems, 
i. e. labor and quality control. They must make continuous efforts to improve production efficiency and increase 
yields by employing unskilled, often young, female rural migrants with resulting high job turnover rates. In 
order to track defective production processes, the input raw materials must be stable in terms of quality at the 
highest standard. 
　Tax exemption and the depreciation of production facilities are also important. Generally speaking, annual 
profits from business activities tend to be spent on capital improvements since average corporate tax is as high 
as 50%. In order to prompt further investment, especially in the small business sector, the government has 
various kinds of favorable treatment. For example, in the first year of the depreciation period of a facility, 30% 
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of the acquisition cost of the facility can be included in expenses as a special depreciation. Further, before the 
corporation tax law was revised in 2007, the salvage value of a facility must be 5-10% of the acquisition cost, 
but it is now only 1 yen which means that a capital investment creates a free cash flow of almost the same 
amount as the investment itself. On the other hand, expenses for assets that cannot be depreciated such as land 
are not recommended. For example, Kaihara’s newest production establishment was built in the center of an 
inland hilly district which Kaihara developed by itself in order to save on construction costs. 
　Kaihara has enough production capacity to cope with current orders, although new spinning lines are under 
construction in order to satisfy unmet in-house demands. Small lot orders are welcome because they can be fitted 
in between the widely fluctuating large lot orders. Approximately 400 prototypes per year are developed for sales 
promotions from the infinite combinations of techniques of each production process. Outside of Kaihara, such 
combinations are initiated by large spinning companies or so-called converters, i. e. textile trading companies, 
who arrange appropriate teams from their network of experts. Such teams can take advantage of flexible 
membership but always run the risk of breaking up due to difficulties in delegating responsibility and profit. 
　Theoretically, small lot orders are from quality apparel manufacturers who pursue differentiation strategies 
targeting relatively limited market segments. Such segments are fashion conscious and lead market trends, and 
so are willing to pay for experimental products. On the other hand, volume zone consumers are cost conscious, 
prefer the functionality of commodities and tend to be slow in adapting fashion trends. The time lag between 
‘innovative’ customers and ‘latecomers’ can provide Kaihara with a portfolio of the best performing quality 
prototypes from the previous season which can then be transferred to the volume zone as the largest source of 
revenue in the next season. 
ANALYSIS
　As has already been said, flexible specialist networks attracted attention based on the expectation that they 
would outperform bureaucratic hierarchies. This has been especially true in the case of Japanese keiretsu 
networks, whose mass production capabilities of standardized products became obsolete when faced with 
the globalization of the economy and the rise of Asian countries. Industrial organizations were required to 
restructure themselves with an emphasis on workers’ high quality expertise and flexible self-organization, which 
were allegedly suited to satisfy diversified consumer needs. Nonetheless, empirical research has emphasized 
certain hierarchical aspects of ‘horizontal’ networks. In this respect, many functional explanations can be drawn 
from a retrospective analysis of successful specialist networks but there are still questions to be answered. That 
is, reasonable decisions must have been made before the central players occupied their present positions and this 
is what this paper has tried to show. 
　The purpose of the distinction which Knight made between ‘uncertainties’ and ‘risks’ was to explain the 
existence of profits within a microeconomic theoretical framework. Under hypothetically perfect competition 
there is no room for the existence of profit; namely, the market price is equal to the cheapest point on the 
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average production cost curve which the best manufacturers can perform. Because it was premised that nothing 
prevents competing economic actors from entering into and exiting from markets in which they are interested, 
the existence of profits attracts market entrants who accelerate price competition until profits become equal 
to zero. Profits, however, do exist in reality because market competition is not always perfect. One of the 
reasons for this is the existence of uncertainties which make economic actors hesitant to choose appropriate 
economic actions that they would otherwise be able to. It is often the case in reality where necessary capital 
investments are insufficient even when more efficient ways of production are known to exist. Because some 
conditions are unknown, most economic actors hesitate. Some do, however, take action for personal motives. 
Such actors are called entrepreneurs. They do take risks but in theory ‘risks’ can be diversified completely by 
forming appropriate portfolios of commodity and financial futures options through the markets, and profits 
are not created as long as the markets are efficient. Therefore, when entrepreneurs receive profits as a sort of 
risk premium, the risks in usual terms must be differentiated from being ‘risky’ in strict terms and complete 
‘uncertainty’ under which nobody can, or is not likely to, take action. That is, when things are at ‘risk,’ some 
aspects of reality, which take the form of probability distributions of events related to certain aspects of 
phenomena, are known beforehand. Weather forecasting is a good example. A database of past weather can 
provide a specific probability of tomorrow’s weather as long as meteorological charts are available. 
　In different terms, when such databases are not available, things are uncertain. The annual sales of a product 
can be interpreted as a risk because usually firms have sales records. Furthermore, an estimate of probability 
distribution can be statistically accurate when sales volumes are large and the recording period is long. On the 
other hand, diversified consumer needs are difficult to estimate. First, the size of a respective market segment 
is relatively small. Second, as seen in the apparel industry, the lifecycle of a product is very short. Third, the 
diversification of consumer needs essentially takes root in people’s tastes which are difficult to analyze and 
therefore make it difficult to build meaningful databases. Such less than reliable databases make economic 
actors feel consumer needs are ‘uncertain. ’
　Traditional production networks can be understood from the perspective of ‘risks.’ Specialists were organized 
like keiretsu and parent companies initiated product definitions to limit product line varieties. Traditionally 
domestic markets absorbed as many products as the manufacturers could produce and the standardization 
of denim jeans was the best choice in order to minimize accidental defects, inventory and sales losses, and 
other general expenses. Whether the manufacturers could gain profits or not was simply a matter of ‘risks’ 
which meant that the volatilities of market demands were derived from literally unforeseen factors. Keiretsu 
networks were best suited to function like fraternal insurance communities. In reality, there was no futures 
market to absorb risks and socially institutionalized mechanisms were developed in order to spread necessary 
capital investments within local districts, and the sharing of profits, if available, depended on each company’s 
contribution. This mechanism was welcome as Japanese companies tended to suffer from high bankruptcy risks 
due to their dependence on indirect financing from commercial banks and debts owed to trading companies. 
What was worse, the debts were often collateralized with a company owner’s private property. 
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　The co-existence of keiretsu within a district contributed to minimal varieties of products which assured the 
survival of the whole district. Usually different keiretsu were not friendly with each other and affiliate experts 
were not recommended to switch between different keiretsu or to sign contracts with them; but this tension was 
functional in terms of the variety of survival routes as a whole when market environments experienced relatively 
big changes. 
　As the global environment changed and parent companies looked for new production venues overseas, the 
keiretsu dissolved and the specialists faced ‘uncertainties’ for the first time. Many specialist affiliate companies 
gave up continuing their family businesses, and the remainder who had the will to survive were urged to form 
flexible networks among themselves; mainly in order to replace decreasing orders from their original parent 
companies with those from new customers who were often very far away from the original district. When 
specialist networks were required to satisfy diversified market segments, such flexibility looked advantageous 
on the surface. Coordination and collaboration, however, to put various ideas into practice and to divide 
responsibilities and available profits required special capabilities. 
　Even if identical resource pools of expertise are available to two different parties, their success depends 
on such factors as the speed and cost of combining available resources and finding appropriate markets. Any 
horizontal relationship demonstrates its power when collaborative efforts bear clear economic fruits. Otherwise 
the negotiation process amongst experts will become fragile. To avoid such circumstances, players need to 
go through collaborative experiences and build trust with each other. To circumvent this lengthy experiential 
learning, especially when market environments are uncertain due to unforeseeable consumer needs and volatile 
demands, one option is to acquire as many experts as possible and become an integrated organization of large 
scale. Collaboration becomes obligatory rather than arbitrary and efficiency can increase as long as good middle 
managers are available to supervise the collaboration processes. Furthermore, this integrative approach can link 
available combinations of resources with as many market needs as possible and create stable revenue streams. 
In the case of Kaihara, the time lag between ‘innovative’ segments and ‘latecomer’ segments created time series 
cash flows and experimental prototyping cycles within product portfolios. Needless to say, Kaihara’s automated 
production system saved on paying wages for unskilled workers and succeeded in saving corporate tax. 
　The argument so far has shown an ex post rationale for becoming central in expert networks, especially 
under recent conditions of fierce global competition. Whether Kaihara intended to become a central expert or 
not is unclear, but what it did clearly intend was to establish a robust business model to protect itself against 
repeated radical devaluations of foreign currency. Traditional kasuri markets had shrunk irreversibly and the 
company became highly dependent on exports. In order to avoid such foreign exchange risks, it started denim 
jeans production in the nascent domestic market but export dependency has become high again. The abrupt 
appreciations of the yen were so harsh that thorough production rationalizations were ceaselessly carried out. 
Therefore, it seems that adaptability to new market environments such as diversified consumer needs and 
volatile demands were only an unintended byproduct. 
　Another byproduct is that Kaihara occupies a central position within denim jeans production networks in the 
－26－
＇Flexible Specialization＇ Revisited: A Case Study of Denim Jeans Production in a Japanese Industrial District 231
Sambi district. Traditionally, spinning companies tend to have a strong influence on product planning in the 
apparel industry and Kaihara is no exception. The point to make here is that Kaihara’s reliability and stability 
in running its business is based on revenue from core customers such as First Retailing and other national brand 
firms. This reliability and stability is likely to create a field of experiential learning in collaboration with small 
lot ‘innovative’ customers, and the knowledge learnt here will become advantageous in negotiations with large 
clients for the next season. This looks like a beneficial circle of knowledge development but capital investments 
are not shared within a community as they used to be, although for the time being core customers seem willing 
to pay premium prices. Although the superior production capabilities which Kaihara has established are the 
robust basis of the customers’ learning community, there may be a secret financial wisdom acting as a true 
source of competitive advantage which outside observers cannot easily access. 
CONCLUSION
　This paper describes a case study of denim jeans production in the Sambi district and discusses the relevance 
of ‘flexible specialization’ in order to characterize the production capabilities which industrial agglomerations 
display when faced with unforeseeable consumer needs and volatile demand. In spite of the general belief that 
flexible specialist networks provide adaptive production capabilities, a vertical integration strategy accompanied 
by heavy capital intensification could continuously develop high quality products as well as spread risk. This 
case study of a denim fabric factory shows how specialist companies were forced to form flexible networks to 
replace decreasing orders from the original parent companies with those from newer and more remote customers. 
Before the Japanese keiretsu system dissolved parent companies had limited product line varieties and created 
a hypothetical fraternal insurance community to cope with demand volatility. During the adaptive process after 
dissolution, a rationale for capital intensification became relevant since facing ‘uncertainties’ needed voluntary 
coordination and collaboration amongst network members; a process which accrued substantial costs. Vertical 
integration was one way to avoid such costs but this seemed to be merely an unintended effect. Kaihara’s initial 
motive was to circumvent foreign exchange risks and in order to do that it had to achieve the highest possible 
production efficiency. Its capital intensification also functioned as an infrastructure for communal learning by 
linking different types of customers. 
　In order to organize the empirical findings so far, Fig. 1 suggests a tentative framework to describe the 
institutional diversity of industrial districts under high uncertainty. The vertical axis signifies a generic strategy 
to approach uncertainty. Economic players either reduce uncertainty to the level of ‘risk’ as explained in Section 2, 
or face uncertainty as it is by enhancing their production capabilities through communal learning. The horizontal 
axis stands for a pattern of inter-corporate coordination. There can be two options between hierarchy and 
horizontal networking. The second and fourth quadrants are ideal types, each of which can fit traditional keiretsu 
systems and current flexible networks. In order to illuminate the essence of the organizing principles of the two 
quadrants, they are called a ‘communal insurance system’ (or I mode system) and a ‘communal learning system’ 
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(or L mode system) respectively. The first and third quadrants are hybrids of the two ideal types. While any ideal 
type is a pure abstraction of a group of phenomena and is composed of its essential elements, their composition 
and operating principles, it is not assumed that the ideal type has an empirical fit with the phenomena. As Kanai 
explained, ideal types may fit with extreme cases amongst all potential phenomena [5]. It may be difficult for 
them to exist in reality because actual economic players are not monolithic enough to fit in to a pure abstraction 
of the empirical world. Our empirical findings seem to fit with the hybrid modes of the two extreme modes and 
let us call them ‘I > L mode’ and ‘I < L mode’ respectively, depending on the weights of the two extreme modes. 
Fig. 2 shows our empirical highlights based on the framework in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 2   Details of the hybrid modes of adaptive systems 
I > L mode system I > L mode system
Out-of-the-district flagship apparel companies reduce 
‘uncertainty’ of denim jeans production. 
Basic organizing 
principle 
Scale  mer i t s  a re  pursued by ups t ream core 
companies. Backup is provided to down-stream small 
manufacturers. 
Recent ICT applications for efficient SCMs to collect 
market information. 
Production
management
techniques
Vertical integration with heavy capital intensifications.
Compared to pure I mode, newer version of traditional 
keiretsu system. Easy to implement. 
Advantages 
to individual
companies
Compared to pure L mode, creative prototyping 
by front line young apparel manufacturers without 
financial backing (who are often new entrants) is 
active. 
Due to the lack of flagship companies within districts 
affiliate companies are required to have more 
discretion. 
Advantages
to the district
Core companies can form portfolios of different 
market segments. SMEs can share prototyping 
capabilities. 
The destiny of the district can be taken over by out-
of-the-district flagship companies. 
Shortcomings Enormous financial risks and long term commitments 
required. 
Fig. 1   A tentative framework to describe the institutional variety of the Sambi District

companies adjustment
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　In more general terms, it is suggested that the advancement of technology can be promoted or impeded 
by social settings which are influenced by the advancement. The case study in this paper has tried so far to 
analyze this interactive cycle within an industrial district where production techniques are affected by a shift 
of consumer orientation from function to quality and the improved production capabilities based on adaptive 
organizations have accelerated the market fragmentation of apparel products. It has also attempted to explain 
the exogenous pressures on districts from various factors including the globalizing economy, volatile foreign 
exchange markets and rising economies in Asia. This cycle has been named ‘co-evolution’ and has attracted a 
certain amount of research which can be traced back as far as Abernathy and Clark and Abernathy and Utterback 
[1, 2]. These researchers compiled a research agenda for those interested in R&D management and technical 
innovation with an emphasis on the cyclic advancement of technology and industry. For example, Abernathy 
and Clark predicted that a mature industry achieves technical versatility to serve various customers at reasonable 
cost. This is because technical and market knowledge is abundantly and cheaply available through interactive 
learning across both supply and demand sides, and production facilities at the highest level of efficiency attain 
flexibility and are fully depreciated. 
　This paper supports Abernathy and Clark’s predictions. However, it is argued that although the existing 
literature has tried to describe a co-evolutionary process it has failed to build a sensible theory concerning 
the process. This paper views a theory as a tool to manage natural and social phenomena through purposive 
explanation, prediction and control. One of the reasons why only description is available is presumably due 
to the concept of evolution. In the field of biology, when a creature evolves random mutation is the source 
of nascent properties of the creature. Because it is random outside observers assume there is no voluntary 
aspect in the mutation process. Such observations, therefore, can only describe arbitrary happenings, or at 
best, grasp the probability of mutation occurring. This idea may be relevant in the field of biology but is not 
so in social science because human beings can act voluntarily. Most human actions in our discussion are also 
intentional since business is a purposive activity for the sake of economic gains. Even accidents are deemed to 
be intentional in that the actors involved originally had different intentions from the consequences of the actions 
taken. The complication can be settled by introducing into the argument the distinction between ex ante and 
ex post analyses of actors’ motives for actions. The following will serve as an example. Kaihara established 
integrated production facilities with an expectation that they would contribute to robustness against exchange 
rate fluctuation rather than technical versatility of the production system. It is also probable that capital 
intensification may be a direct consequence of tax saving motives. These original intentions seem to have only 
the slightest connection with the cyclic advancement of product differentiation and a superior production system 
with a view to higher economic performance. In effect, however, the actions taken did contribute to them. 
　Once the cyclic mechanism between technical and institutional advancements is acknowledged, the cycle 
can become an object of purposive management. As far as performance targets can be set, any deviance from 
the targets based on either intended or unintended consequences of actions taken can be corrected by reflective 
corrective actions. Apart from the description of ex ante motives of actions taken, feedback from ex post 
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analyses on what has been done so far contributes to restrain performance fluctuation. To determine empirically 
whether Kaihara tried such purposive controls in the learning cycle or not is one thing but discussing the 
potential of such controllability in general terms may be of greater importance. Further, the ex post analyses 
of the cycle may provide an interesting hypothesis worthy of empirical testing. Namely, capital intensification 
in comparison with other available strategic options may provide a deep and wide learning basis for better 
performance through better services for segmented customers. Metaphysical arguments concerning communal 
learning have been attracting the attention of many researchers these days [11]. This paper may provide a 
working hypothesis in order to put empirical flesh on the theoretical bones with a view to middle range theory 
construction. 
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
　For instructional purposes such as class room discussions it may be useful here to provide a few questions. 
Students may reach a deeper understanding of the case and prepare an analysis of their own. 
(1)　 Recent theoretical advancement suggests that recent major technological breakthroughs should be called 
‘open innovations. ’The term presumes flexible and fluid social bases of R&D activities in place of in-
house R&D institutions within large corporations which used to be a major driving force of technical 
advancements. Carry out research on the term and explain the context where such social movements 
became prevalent by replacing traditional ways of thought about how R&D activities should be organized. 
(2)　 Kaihara is NOT a good example of ‘open innovation’ because it vertically integrates a wide range of 
production processes within their fully automated factory. As has already been explained, such an option 
can contribute to the competitive advantage of the firm in a certain way but it also requires heavy capital 
intensification which often increases ‘sunk costs’ and decreases strategic flexibility in many ways. Imagine 
that you are a middle manager of a company which can enjoy the fruit of capital intensification of the same 
sort but senior management are worried about potential financial failure on a devastating scale. How can 
you convince the worried senior management that they should move toward open innovation? Identify the 
nature of the industry you are in and provide a rationale for the strategy. 
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